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Summary 
We conceive firm productive activity as being crucially determined by the performance 
of complex tasks which possess the characteristics of trust games. We show that in trust 
games with superadditivity the non cooperative solution yielding a suboptimal firm 
output is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the uniperiodal full 
information game when i) the trustor has superior stand alone contribution to output and 
ii) the superadditive component is inferior to the sum of trustee and trustor stand alone 
contributions to output. We show that, if relational preferences of the two players are 
sufficiently high, the result is reversed. We also document that the Folk Theorem 
applies to the infinitely repeated game, even in absence of relational preferences, but the 
enforceable cooperative equilibrium is not renegotiation proof. We finally show that the 
cooperative equilibrium is not attainable under single winner tournament schemes and 
that steeper pay for performance schemes may crowd out information sharing in 
presence of players preferences for relational goods. Our findings help to explain why 
firms are reluctant to use pay for performance and tournament incentive schemes and 
why they invest money to increase the quality of relational goods among employees. 
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1 Introduction
When we conceive the corporate workforce as being composed by self in-
terested individuals maximising consumption under standard budget con-
straints in a framework of asymmetric information with moral hazard, it
becomes hard to explain why contemporary firms invest money to increase
the quality of relationships among workers inside and outside the workplace2
and why pay for performance schemes are relatively less and team compen-
sation schemes are relatively more widespread than expected (Baker, Jensen
and Murphy, 1988; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002)3.
In this paper we try to explain these two apparent puzzles by introducing
some changes in the way we conceive firms and by arguing that: i) an essen-
tial trait of contemporary firms is that their activity crucially depends on
the realisation of complex tasks which require the combination of nonover-
lapping skills of several workers and possess the intrinsic characteristics of
trust games with superadditivity; ii) individuals have relational preferences
”Mattei” in Milan and at the 2006 workshop on ”CSR and corporate governance” of the In-
ternational Economic Association. The authors thank Luciano Andreozzi, Masahiko Aoki,
Avner Ben Ner, Bruce Chapman, Allen Kaufman, Bruno Frey, Lorenzo Sacconi, Margit
Osterloh, Alessandro Vercelli, Oliver Williamson and all other participants to these con-
ferences for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Annalisa Luporini for her
precious suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
2One of the biggest Italian banks, Mediobanca, finances weekend skying holidays to
their management with the motivation that it makes the business more fluid. In the
U.S., the NRG Systems, a global manufacturer of wind measuring systems, received the
2004 Psychologically Healthy Workplace Award for small businesses from the Vermont
Psychological Association (VPA) thanks to their overall workforce practices and benefits
and the emphasis they have placed on a creating a healthy workplace.
3Empirical evidence shows that profit sharing plans are quite popular. In 1988, 20
percent of the US labor force (22 million employees) participated in over 400,000 workplace
profit-sharing plans. The number of profit-sharing pension plans has increased by 19,000
per year since 1970. Lawler (1971, p. 158) quotes six different works on the relationship
between pay and performance, and finds that ”their evidence indicates that pay is not very
closely related to performance in many organizations that claim to have merit increase
salary systems. The studies suggest that many business organizations do not do a very
good job of tying pay to performance. This conclusion is rather surprising in light of
many companies very frequent claims that their pay systems are based on merit.” Frey
(1997) adds that pay for performance is much less used for middle-level employees than for
workers employed in repetitive activities since the latter have lower intrinsic motivations
and therefore crowding out effects are reduced.
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(i.e. a taste for quality of relationships) with working colleagues4.
By introducing these two elements we are able to show under different
versions (uniperiodal, infinitely repeated, with perfect or imperfect infor-
mation) of our basic corporate trust game that lower quality of relational
goods, individual pay for performance schemes and (single winner) tourna-
ment incentive structures significantly widen the parametric space of non-
cooperative5 equilibria which, in turn, reduce the circulation of knowledge
and the interaction of different competencies, yielding suboptimal output
for the firm.
Our theoretical framework introduces some elements which are original
(in themselves or in the way they are combined in the model) in the litera-
ture. First, it refers to relational preferences which are closely related to, but
also represent a slight departure from the more traditional and established
field of studies on reciprocity. Fehr and Gachter (2000) show that reciprocity
is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts. More specif-
ically, reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentives inefficient
because the latter may enhance a non-cooperative behaviour6. The hypoth-
esis that reciprocity plays a role in determining effort for a significant part
of workers has been successfully tested in several laboratory experiments
(Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Bewley,
1995)7. The concept of relational goods (Ash, 2000) that we introduce is
4To provide empirical evidence on this second point we report in the Appendix 1
econometric findings showing how the time spent with working colleagues outside the
jobplace has positive effects on individual’s happiness.
5Note that we define as cooperative solution in the paper the equilibrium given by the
(share, not abuse) pair of strategies (see Figure 1, Appendix 2) and as non cooperative
solutions the two equilibria which do not imply the joint work of the two players. Hence,
the term cooperative is not referred to the structure of the game (or to the coordina-
tion/noncoordination of players decisions) but to the characteristics of its equilibrium.
6The employment relationship may be characterized by complete or incomplete con-
tracts. Under complete contracts a cooperative job attitude would be superfluous because
all relevant actions would be described and enforceable, while, under incomplete contracts,
workers have a high degree of discretion over effort levels since no explicit performance
incentives are defined. In this case reciprocity can be very important in the labor process
since, if a substantial fraction of the work force is motivated by reciprocity considera-
tions, employers can affect the degree of cooperation by varying the generosity of the
compensation package.
7A crucial question in this field is to understand how material incentives based on per-
formance interact with reciprocity. Following Fehr and Gachter (2000) two main aspects
have to be taken into account: i) reciprocity increases the extra effort determined by ma-
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slightly different from that of reciprocity and may help to shed light on
the interaction between material incentives and productivity. According to
Uhlaner (1989) and Gui (2000) relational goods are local public goods that
need i) to be jointly co-produced and ii) to be simultaneously co-consumed
to be enjoyed 8 While a sufficient condition for reciprocity is the feeling
of the obligation to reciprocate what has been received by a counterpart
and, therefore, a general sense of justice, relational values are more related
to the pleasure that individuals have in spending time with other human
beings. In support of the relational good approach and of its importance
in the jobplace, Frey (1997) argues that more personal relationships imply
recognition, trust and loyalty which support intrinsic motivation. Hence,
our point is that the focus on the dynamics of relational goods does not
exactly coincide, but is at the root of the widely analysed phenomena of
trust, reciprocity and intrinsic motivation, since the latter tend to be based
not only on abstract principles or on a Kantian sense of duty, but also on
the quality of relationships. In our paper an original virtuous link between
relational goods and productivity is identified within the structure of the
”trust game corporation”. In the corporate trust game relational goods in-
crease the penalty for a noncooperative attitude (represented by the loss of
the accumulated relational stock) and therefore reduce the parametric space
of noncooperative equilibria which are supboptimal on the productive point of
view. We therefore identify a positive nexus which goes from the quality of
workers relationships to the willingness to share information and cooperate
and, from the latter, to firm productivity. A second novelty of the paper
is that it applies the standard trust game approach to the literature of the
organisation of the firm. As it is well known, there is ample experimen-
terial incentives and ii) explicit incentives may cause a hostile atmosphere of threat and
distrust which reduces any reciprocity-based extra effort.
8Standard microeconomic foundations of agents utility usually neglect the fact that the
latter does not depend only on the amount of consumed goods but also, at least, on the
relational context in which material goods are consumed (eating a pizza alone is not the
same as eating a pizza with friends or with the love partner). Going back to the history of
economic thought, one of the nicest and deepest interpretations of the link between social
ties and happiness is provided by Adam Smith (1759) with its well known theory of fellow
feelings. In the Theory of moral sentiments Smith argues that the effect of relational goods
on happiness is increasing in i) the amount of time and experiences that two individuals
have lived together and have shared in the past and ii) their common consent, with the
former significantly affecting the latter.
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tal literature showing that predictions from standard noncooperative game
theory do not apply to large part of two-person trust games (McCabe et
al., 2003; Berg,et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 1998; Ben Ner and Putterman,
2006). There is no literature, to our knowledge, studying consequences of
trust games among co-workers. Consider also that there exist some crucial
differences stemming from the necessarily different assumptions between our
corporate trust game and the above mentioned (non corporate) experimen-
tal trust games. In the standard Berg,et al. (1995) trust game, extended
by Ben Ner and Putterman (2006), the trustee can arbitrarily decide how
much output to give back to the trustor. Furthermore, situations similar to
the pay for performance schemes described in section 3.1 where the trustee
decision not to abuse implies a specific penalty (loss of part of his pay for
performance fee) have not been tested.
The motivation behind our decision to model the productive activity of
the firm as a corporate trust game arises from the fact that, when we depart
from the assembly line perspective and move toward a firm in which workers
skills are fundamental to create value and innovate products and processes,
corporate activity becomes more complex and requires the sharing and in-
teraction of different nonoverlapping competencies and information9. Third,
the paper fills a gap in the theory of the firm by introducing additional ele-
ments which help to reconcile theoretical models with the above mentioned
empirical evidence on the (lower than expected) diffusion of individual pay
for performance schemes10 and the (higher than expected) diffusion of profit
sharing or team compensation schemes, especially when we focus on non
manual worker (Frey, 1977; Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1998; Baker, Gib-
bons and Murphy, 2002). This evidence is difficult to reconcile with the
standard theory of the firm and with the traditional argument in the litera-
9Thompson and Wallace (1996) argue that, with the development of lean production
and other forms of work organization under advanced manufacturing, teamworking has
emerged as a central focus of redesigning production. Katz and Rosemberg (2004) argue
that that the productivity of an organization crucially depends on cooperation between
workers and highlight the importance of altruistic and cooperative attributes in workers
emphasized by the organizational theory (see, for example, Smith et al. (1983), Organ
(1988), Organ and Ryan (1995), McNeely and Meglino (1994), Penner et al, (1997) and
Podsakoff and Mackenzie (1993)).
10Baker et al. (1998) argue that when measures of individual performance are available,
it always seems better to tie pay to individual performance rather than to overall firm
performance.
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ture that tournament schemes may raise performance when the disciplining
effect, as it is conventionally assumed, is larger than the crowding-out effect
of intrinsic motivation (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Some of the rationales
advanced to explain this puzzle come from psychologists and behaviorists.
Deci and Ryan (1985) identify a trade-off between monetary compensation
and intrinsic rewards11. Slater (1980) argues that money as a motivator has
negative effects on product quality. Kohn (1988) argues that monetary re-
wards encourage people to focus narrowly on a task, to do it as quickly as
possible, and to take few risks. Other potential explanations for this puzzle
are horizontal equity concerns, and imperfect performance measurement12.
In our model we show that the conception of firm activity as a series of trust
games in which different tasks and information from various individuals
are combined may be, under reasonable parametric assumptions, a sufficient
condition for determining the relative inconvenience of single winner tourna-
ment schemes even without considering the crowding out effect on intrinsic
motivations and, therefore, purely on extrinsic motivation grounds. We also
show that the presence of relational goods introduces a specific crowding out
effect of pay for performance schemes on cooperation.
The paper derives the above mentioned considerations from a theoret-
ical model and is divided into six sections (introduction and conclusions
included). In the second section we examine the uniperiodal and the in-
finitely repeated full information games (with and without the presence of
relational goods) when the two players own the company. In the third section
we look for Bayesian equilibria under the assumption of players’ uncertainty
on skills and relational attitudes of their counterparts. In the fourth section
we find equilibria for the corporate trust game when players are firm em-
ployees and pay for performance and tournament schemes are introduced.
In the fifth section we briefly illustrate the optimal corporate policy for trust
game corporations.
11The crowding out hypothesis relies on the assumption that, if workers are already
intrinsically motivated, an extrinsic reward overmotivates them and therefore they ra-
tionally react by reducing the motivation which is under their control (i.e. the intrinsic
motivation).
12On the role of intrinsic motivation on the behaviour of economic agents see, among
others, Frey (1997) and Kreps (1997).
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2 The basic trust game when the players own the
company
We assume that the productive activity of a firm originates from the per-
formance of complex tasks13 which require the contribution of knowledge,
inventive skills and ideas of workers with (partially) nonoverlapping human
capital endowments. In our specific case we assume that any complex task
consists of a trust game between two firm employees, player A and B, en-
dowed with personal skills (stand alone contributions to final output) that
we term, respectively, as ha ∈ R+ and hb ∈ R+. The trust game is a se-
quential game in which one of the two players (player A, the trustor) may
decide whether sharing or not his skills with the other player. In the second
stage of the game the second player (player B, the trustee) may decide to
cooperate or abuse. We assume in the model that sharing ideas, projects,
intuitions creates a positive esternality - that we introduce in the model as a
superadditive component (e ∈ [0,∞]) - generated by the dialogical process
of jointly performing the task and by the initial knowledge sharing (Figure
1, Appendix 2) 14.
Summing up the set of strategies available to the two players, player A (the
trustor) may decide to share (s strategy) or not to share (ns strategy) his
initial ideas to the trustee who, in turn, may decide to abuse (a strategy)
or not (na strategy). If the trustee decides to abuse he will join his ideas
with those of the trustor and present everything as his own work, while, if
he decides to share, the two players will interact and produce as additional
contribution to the output a superadditive component e stemming from the
integration of players perspectives, to which new ideas arising from the in-
teraction also contribute. We assume in this case that the final output is
13Consider for instance a blueprint in which different contributors skills are production
inputs related by some forms of complementarity. Or the definition of a corporate strategy
which requires participants from different firm divisions to share knowledge and skills. The
same scheme could be applied in different (non corporate) fields of activity considering, for
instance, a co-authored academic working paper to which different researchers contribute
with their specialised skills.
14Our point here is that dialogue, interaction and information sharing is indispensable to
the act of cognition which improves productive knowledge. In particular, superadditivity
implies that i) part of productive skills may be acquired only by integrating experiences
of different people ii) learning is a process which can be enhanced by explaining and
confronting ones own knowledge with that of a workmate.
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split between the two players. Under these assumptions the set of payoffs
(player A, player B and firm output) are:
{(0 | ha < hb, ha | ha > hb), (0 | ha > hb, hb | ha < hb),Max(ha, hb)}15 if
player A does not share;
{0, ha + hb, ha + hb}16 if player A shares but player B chooses to abuse;
{(ha + hb + e)/2, (ha + hb + e)/2, ha + hb + e}, if player A shares and player
B cooperates.
The game is represented in the extensive form in Figure 1 (see Appendix 2).
The analysis of the uniperiodal trust game leads us to formulate the follow-
ing proposition
Proposition 1. The non sharing solution yielding a suboptimal firm output
is the SPNE of the uniperiodal full information game when i) the trustor
has higher stand alone contribution to output than the trustee and ii) the
superadditive component is inferior to the sum of trustee and trustor stand
alone contributions.
When ha > hb, players A payoff is ha if he does not cooperate and 0 if he
decides to cooperate but player B abuses, as he will do when ha + hb >
(ha + hb + e)/2, or, e < ha + hb. Hence, if ha > hb and e < ha + hb, the
non sharing solution is the SPNE of the uniperiodal full information game17.
Consider that the SPNE yields a firm output - Max(ha, hb) which is lower
than the one achievable under cooperation (ha + hb + e), and even lower
than that obtainable under the (share, abuse) pair of strategies18. The loss
15The assumption here is that some authority external to the two players will pick
up the best individual blueprint. We may imagine that, in a competition for a project,
the two players, when not agreeing to cooperate, decide to participate separately to the
competition.
16The assumption here is that the two players competencies and skills do not overlap.
If they do, the total output of player B in the (s,a) solution and the one shared by the two
players in the (s,na) solution should be the non overlapping part of the sum of the two
stand alone contributions. A second assumption is that the trustee has sufficient skills to
be able to manage the contribution provided by the trustor and therefore to abuse of it.
17Two consequences of the SPNE of the game which are intuitively reasonable are that:
i) the trustor’s decision to share crucially depends on the knowledge that his stand alone
contribution to output is lower than that of the trustee; ii) the likelihood of the occurrence
of the (share, not abuse) solution is higher when the two players’ stand alone contributions
are small with respect to the output they can generate by applying together to the problem
(i.e. the task has complex rules that can be interpreted only by combining players skills).
18We reasonably assume that, when player B abuses, he exploits player A information
for his own project before starting the cooperative process of jointly performing the task
and, therefore, e=0.
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of social surplus (and of firm productive potential) therefore amounts to
ha + hb + e −Max(ha, hb). If, on the contrary, ha < hb and e < ha + hb,
player A is indifferent between the two available strategies (share and do
not share), since the payoff that he will receive is the same in both cases.
In such case the SPNE equilibrium can alternatively be represented by the
following strategy pairs, (ns,.) or (s,a), yielding again a suboptimal firm
output with a social loss, respectively, equal to ha + hb + e −Max(ha, hb)
or e19. 
To sum up, the full information uniperiodal game shows that, when the
trustors stand alone contribution is higher, the subgame perfect equilibrium
is a non information sharing solution and the firm output is inferior to its
maximum potential. Under the alternative assumption on the relative hu-
man capital endowments of the two players we have two possible solutions.
Both of them do not imply information sharing and still yield a suboptimal
firm output.
A graphic representation of the cooperation area is provided in Graphic
1 (in Appendix 2) in which the superadditivity component is on the horizon-
tal axis, the trustor stand alone contribution is on the vertical axis and the
trustee stand alone contribution is fixed. The area of information sharing
equilibria is the one, below the fixed level of trustee stand alone contribu-
tion, in which e > ha + hb
2.1 The basic one period trust game when players own the
company with relational goods
In the basic version of the model presented in section 2 we did not take into
account the role of relational goods. As already mentioned in the introduc-
tion, more personal relationships imply recognition, trust and loyalty which
support intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997). Relational preferences (and the
enjoyment of relational goods) are therefore one of the fundamental inputs
of trust and reciprocity. Their introduction into players preferences needs
to be motivated. In the Appendix 1 we provide empirical evidence which
supports our choice showing that, in a sample of more than 100,000 indi-
19Note that the trustor would strictly prefer the (ns, .) solution if we add some forms
of inequity aversion to the model.
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viduals from 82 countries drawn from the World Value Survey database,
the time spent with job friends outside the jobplace significantly increases
the probability of declaring oneself very happy, net of the effect of standard
controls traditionally used in the empirical happiness literature.
In this section we assume that the two players have a stock of accumulated
relational goods equal to (F) which depends on the number of times they
have cooperated in the past and may jointly produce a relational good (f)
with their decision to cooperate. The solution of the uniperiodal game with
relational goods leads us to formulate the following proposition
Proposition 2. In the uniperiodal full information game, when (ha + hb −
e)/2 > F , there exists a threshold value of the relational good in the trustee
utility function (f*) which triggers the switch from the non cooperative to
the cooperative (share, not abuse) equilibrium.
In presence of relational goods the payoff set (player A and player B payoffs
and firm output) becomes:
{(F | ha < hb, F+ha | ha > hb), (F | ha > hb, F+hb | ha < hb),Max(ha, hb)}
if player A does not share;
{0, ha + hb, ha + hb}, if player A shares but player B chooses to abuse;
{(ha + hb + e)/2 + F + f, (ha + hb + e)/2 + F + f, ha + hb + e}, if player A
shares and player B does not abuse (Figure 2, Appendix 2).20
If ha > hb, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the full information uniperi-
odal game is (ns, .) On the other hand, if hb > ha , player B chooses to
abuse when ha + hb > e + 2(F + f) (which represents the new abuse con-
dition in presence of value of relational goods). Again, the non cooperative
solution yields a firm output, Max(ha, hb), which is lower than ha + hb + e
(that is, firm output under the (s, na) equilibrium) and lower than that ob-
tained under the (s, a) solution. Hence, given the new abuse condition, if
(ha + hb − e)/2 > F , we may identify a threshold (f*) in the value of the
relational goods for the trustee above which the (share, not abuse) couple
20Our underlying assumption is that the accumulated stock of relational goods between
the two players may be lost only when one of the two decides to abuse and not when he
decides not to share. Under this condition, in presence of relational goods, the trustor
will not be indifferent anymore between sharing or not when ha < hb and the no abuse
condition is not met since, by sharing, he will induce into temptation the other part
with the risk of loosing the accumulated stock of relational goods. Hence, if F > 0 and
ha < hb, the (ns,.) strategy is strictly preferred. Under this case the firm output is always
suboptimal but may be inferior in presence of relational goods.
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of strategies becomes the SPNE of the single period full information game.
Such threshold is equal to f*= (ha + hb − e)/2− F . 
By examining now the abuse condition we observe that the incentive to
abuse is reduced because of the potential loss of the stock of relational goods
and the missed production of new relational goods in case of non cooperation
(see Figure 2). The introduction of relational goods therefore identifies a
virtuous circle among quality of workers relationship, decision to cooperate
(which further increases the quality of relationships) and firm productivity,
or among relational goods, social capital (under the form of trust) and firm
productivity (see Graphic 2 and Figure 2).
It is easy to check that, a finite (two) period trust game has the same
characteristics of the single period one since, when the no abuse condition
is not met, with backward induction the trustor will anticipate the trustee
abuse in the second period and will decide not to share in both periods
(solutions of this game are omitted for reasons of space and available upon
request).
2.2 The infinitely repeated game
The analysis of the infinitely repeated version of the game without relational
goods leads us to formulate the following proposition
Proposition 2. In the full information infinitely repeated trust game, the
(share, no abuse) equilibrium may be applied without the need of relational
goods for reasonable discount rates, but it may never hold, under given para-
metric conditions, when the trustee has higher stand alone contribution than
the trustor. Even when the (share, not abuse) equilibrium applies, it is how-
ever based on a trustor threat which is not renegotiation proof.
The Folk Theorem applies to the infinitely repeated game if there exists a
δ ∈ [0, 1] 21 such that the (share, not abuse) equilibrium is enforceable. By
applying it to this modified version of the game we get (1 − δ˜)(ha + hb) =
(ha + hb + e)/2, if ha > hb , and (1 − δ˜)(ha + hb) + δ˜hb = (ha + hb + e)/2,
if ha < hb. If ha > hb, δ˜ = 1/2 − e/[2(ha + hb)], which is below 1
21As it is well known δ is the inverse of the subjective discount rate or the standard
measure of players patience. Consider that higher values of δ can also be viewed as a
measure of the reduced distance between two consecutive stages of the game.
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for reasonable parametric values. On the other hand, if hb > ha, δ˜ =
1/2 + (1/2)(hb/ha)− e/ha. Under reasonable parametric conditions - and,
more specifically, when [(hb − ha)/2] < e we get δ˜ > 1 and the coop-
erative equilibrium may not be enforced. The renegotiation argument ap-
plies here. Consider that the punishment strategy costs any period to the
trustor (ha + hb + e)/2, if ha < hb, and (ha + hb + e)/2 − ha if ha > hb.
Hence, the trustee may propose, after abusing in the first period, a pre-
liminary side payment of ε, when ha < hb, or ha + ε, when ha < hb,
conditional to the trustor’s commitment to share in the following period.
The trustor should strictly prefer the new proposal which may be repeated
an infinite number of times after any abuse by the trustee. Hence, we
get (1 − δ˜)(ha + hb) + δ˜(ha + hb − ε) = (ha + hb + e)/2, if ha < hb, and
(1− δ˜)(ha + hb) + δ˜(hb + ε) = (ha + hb + e)/2, if ha > hb. It is easy to check
that, in both cases, and especially when ha < hb, δ˜ > 1 under reasonable
parametric conditions. 
Notice that the Folk Theorem condition under ha > hb implies that
the minimum trustee patience required to have a cooperation equilibrium
is negatively related to the ratio between the superadditive component and
the sum of the two players stand alone contributions. The intuition is that
the superadditive component is what players loose when they decide not
to cooperate. If the loss is high, a cooperative equilibrium can be enforced
also when the trustee has limited patience. When, on the contrary, hb > ha
the Folk Theorem condition implies that the minimum trustee patience re-
quired to have a cooperation equilibrium is higher and depends positively
from the trustee stand alone contribution and negatively from the superad-
ditive component and trustor stand alone contribution which are part of the
punishment in case of abuse.
3 The trust game with imperfect information
We have assumed so far that players are perfectly informed about game
payoffs and each other skills. More realistically, corporate trust game play-
ers have to deal with an incomplete information framework. We reasonably
argue that informational asymmetry in the corporate trust game may be
related to: i) the relational attitude of the other player, that is, the pres-
ence in his utility function of a positive argument related to the cooperation
12
with his colleague; ii) the stand alone contribution to output of the other
player. In this version of the model we deal with the first type of imperfect
information. The assumption of imperfect knowledge of the counterpart re-
lational attitudes obviously implies that the two players have not enjoyed
cooperation before and, therefore, that F = 0. More specifically, we assume
that each player attaches a probability p ∈ [0, 1] to the likelihood that his
counterpart gives a value f to the relational good produced by the cooper-
ative working activity (see Figure 3, Appendix 3). The modified framework
of the game leads us to formulate the following proposition
Proposition 3. The trustor imperfect information about the trustee’s rela-
tional preferences raises the threshold value of the relational good required to
ensure the (share, not abuse) equilibrium.
If each player attaches a probability p to the likelihood that his counterpart
gives a value f to the relational good produced by the cooperative working
activity the no abuse condition becomes 2pf + e > ha + hb. Hence, the
Bayesian NE of the game is: i) (ns,.) if p(e+ 2f) + (1− p)e < ha + hb and
ha > hb; ii) (ns,.) or (s, a) if p(e + 2f) + (1 − p)e < ha + hb and ha < hb;
iii) (s,na) if p(e+ 2f) + (1− p)e > ha + hb. Considering the three different
solutions, we assume that a threshold probability value p∗′ exists, such that,
when p > p∗′, the (share, not abuse) pair of strategies becomes the NE of
the game. We can obtain p∗′ as p∗′ = (ha+hb+ e)/2f . For p∗′ < 1 we need
f∗′ > [(ha + hb + e)/2]/p∗′.This implies a threshold value of the relational
good under uncertainty which is higher than its certainty correspondent (in
which p = 1). 
This result shows that the no abuse condition with incomplete information
is respected only if the relational good produced by the interaction of the
two players is big enough to compensate the cost of the uncertainty about
the counterpart relational attitude (see Figure 4, Appendix 2). Let us con-
sider a second case of imperfect information related to the counterpart stand
alone contribution. We assume here that player A assigns a subjective prob-
ability p1(p1 ∈ [0, 1]) to the ha > hb hypothesis, while player B a subjective
probability p2, (p2 ∈ [0, 1]) to the alternative ha < hb hypothesis (see Figure
4). We also assume that each player does not know the guess of the other.
The inspection of the corporate trust game which incorporates these new
assumptions leads us to formulate the following proposition
Proposition 4. In presence of imperfect information on the counterpart stand
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alone contribution, the non sharing solution yielding a suboptimal firm out-
put is the SPNE of the uniperiodal full information game when the super-
additive component is inferior to the sum of the trustee and trustor stand
alone contributions to output (the no abuse condition is unaltered with re-
spect to the full information model) but the superiority of the trustee stand
alone contribution is no more required for the uniqueness of the (ns,.) equi-
librium.
It is easy to check that as in the previous case, the no abuse condition is
e > ha + hb, exactly the same as in the full information uniperiodal game.
For the second part of the proposition consider that, with p1 > 0, when
the no abuse condition is not met, the trustor will always choose the (ns,.)
equilibrium22.
The intuition for the first part of this proposition is obvious. The no
abuse condition compares two trustees payoffs (conditional to the abuse and
not abuse strategies respectively) under the assumption that the trustor has
decided to share information. In both cases the trustee payoff includes the
sum of the two players contributions and therefore the relative superiority of
one of the two stand alone contributions does not matter. The second result
of this proposition depends on the fact that, under imperfect information
on counterpart’s skills, each player always attaches a nonzero probability to
the fact that his skills may be superior to those of the other player.
4 Basic Trust Game when the Players do not own
the Company
We now examine how equilibria change when we remove the assumption
that the two players own the company. In this version of our model we
show that the conception of firm activity as a series of trust games in which
different tasks and information from various individuals are combined may
be, under reasonable side assumptions, a sufficient condition for determining
the relative inconvenience of single winner tournaments (or pay for perfor-
22Hence, when player stand alone contribution is imperfectly known by the counterpart,
the paradoxical case (see footnote 20) in which relational goods may induce a lower output
when the no abuse condition is not met (Max[ha, hb] instead of ha + hb) does not apply
anymore, since this outcome occurs even without relational goods.
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mance schemes in presence of workers taste for relational goods). This result
holds without considering the crowding out effect on intrinsic motivations
and, therefore, purely on extrinsic motivation grounds. We in fact show
that: i) when the activity of a firm is conceived as a trust game and, in
presence of relational goods, a steeper pay for performance scheme increases
the probability of non cooperative equilibria for given parametric values ; ii)
the cooperative equilibrium can never be attained with the introduction of
a single winner tournament scheme, even in absence of relational goods.
4.1 Pay for performance schemes
We start by considering a simple pay-for-performance structure, consisting
of a fixed remuneration (wa for player A, and wb for player B) plus an addi-
tional share s ∈ [0, 1] of the employees performance when it contributes to
firm output. The inspection of the uniperiodal and infinitely repeated games
under the new framework leads us to formulate the following proposition
Proposition 5. Individual pay for performance schemes are neutral in corpo-
rate trust games in which players do not own the firm, as they do not help
to widen the parametric space of the cooperative equilibrium. In presence of
relational goods pay for performance schemes crowd out cooperation since a
steeper pay for performance scheme may trigger the switch from a cooper-
ative (productively optimal) to a non cooperative (productively suboptimal)
equilibrium. Hence, pay for performance schemes crowd out cooperation.
Under the pay for performance scheme framework the set of payoffs is
{wa + s(ha | ha > hb, 0 | ha < hb), wb + s(hb | ha < hb, 0 | ha > hb),
(1− s)[Max(ha, hb)]− wa + wb}
under the (ns,.) pair of strategies, while it is
{wa, wb+ s(ha+hb), (1− s)(ha+hb)−wa+wb} and {wa+ s(ha+hb+ e)/2
, wb + s(ha + hb + e)/2, (1− s)(ha + hb + e)−wa +wb} under the (s,a) and
(s,na) pairs, respectively (see Figure 5).
It is easy to check in this case that the no abuse condition (e > ha + hb)
corresponds to the no abuse condition of the full information game when
players own the company. Let us evaluate the effect of relational goods
in this framework. The payoff set under the (ns,.), (s,a) and (s,na) pairs
becomes respectively {F +wa + s(ha | ha > hb, 0 | ha < hb), F +wb + s(hb |
hb > ha, 0 | hb < ha), (1− s)[Max(ha, hb)]− wa + wb}
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{wa, wb + s(ha + hb), ha + hb} and
{F + f +wa + s(ha + hb + e)/2, F + f +wb + s(ha + hb + e)/2, (1− s)(ha +
hb + e)− wa + wb} (Figure 8).
The no abuse condition in this case is e > ha + hb − 2(F + f)/s and does
not correspond anymore to the one of the full information game in which
players own the company .
Note that, with s = 1, we revert to the situation in which players own
the company but, as far as s gets lower (and the pay for performance scheme
gets flatter), the effect that preferences and enjoyment of relational goods
have on making the no abuse condition easier to be met are enhanced. This
result shows that, given the simple structure of corporate trust games, pay
for performance schemes crowd out quality of relationship and trust and pro-
vides a simple rationale to the puzzle evidenced, among others, by Baker,
Jensen and Murphy (1998) on the relatively low use of individual pay for
performance schemes in personnel management. It implies that a steeper
reward scheme (s) may trigger the switch from the cooperative (s, na) to
the non cooperative solutions of the game. The intuition is that (s) becomes
the relative price of the relational goods in terms of missed outperformance
arising from the abuse strategy and this relative price rises as far as the
share gets higher.
The inspection of this specific version of the game repeated in time confirms
the main finding of the uniperiodal game and leads us to formulate the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 6. In the two period and in the infinitely repeated trust game
when the two players do not own the firm, steeper individual pay for perfor-
mance schemes are neutral in absence of relational goods, while they reduce
the parametric space of cooperation in presence of relational goods .
Let us start with the two period game without relational goods (Figure 5,
Appendix 2). The solution crucially depends again from the relative stand
alone contributions. When we assume ha > hb the no abuse condition is
[wb + s(ha + hb + e)/2](1 + δ) > wb + s(ha + hb) + δwb 23
Consider that, here again, the no abuse condition does not depend on s and
reduces to that of the two period model when the two players own the firm.
Furthermore, the no abuse condition requires that δ > 1−e/(ha+hb), which
23Note that, with s = 1 and δ = 0, we revert to the no abuse condition of the full
information single period game of section 2, while, with s = 0 and δ = 0, to a single
period fixed wage model.
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may be easily satisfied under reasonable parametric assumptions.
Let us suppose now that ha < hb. In this case, the no abuse condition is
[wb+ s(ha+hb+ e)/2](1+ δ) > wb+ s(ha+hb)+ δ(wb+ shb) which reduces,
again, to e > ha+hb, that is, the no abuse condition of single period full infor-
mation game when the two players own the firm. Consider now the presence
of relational goods in the two period game (Figure 10). Under ha > hb the no
abuse condition is wb+s(ha+hb)+δwb < F+[f+wb+s(ha+hb+e)/2](1+δ)
yielding δ > [s(ha+hb−e)−2F−2f ]/[2f+s(ha+hb+e)]. Under ha < hb the
no abuse condition is wb+s(ha+hb)+δ(wb+shb) < F+[f+wb+s(ha+hb+
e)/2](1+δ) yielding δ > [s(ha+hb−e)−2F−2f ]/[2f+s(ha−hb+e)]. Hence
we conclude that, even in the two period game, steeper pay for performance
schemes are neutral in absence of relational goods, while they reduce the
parametric space of cooperation in presence of relational goods. In the same
way, in an infinitely repeated game in absence of relational goods, and, when
ha > hb, we have (1−δ˜)[wb+s(ha+hb)]+δ˜wb = wb+s(ha+hb+e)/2, yielding
δ˜ = 1/2− e/2(ha + hb) Hence, a δ˜ exists such that the Folk Theorem holds.
Such value does not depend on the pay for performance scheme. When
ha < hb we have (1− δ˜)[wb+s(ha+hb)]+ δ˜(wb+shb) = wb+s(ha+hb+e)/2,
yielding δ˜ = [ha + hbe]/2ha .
Let us now consider the infinitely repeated game with relational goods (Fig-
ure 6, Appendix 2).
Under ha > hb we get (1− δ˜)[wb + s(ha + hb)] + δ˜wb = F + f +wb + s(ha +
hb + e)/2 which yields δ˜ = [ha + hb − e]/[2(ha + hb)]− (F + f)/[s(ha + hb)].
When ha < hb we have (1 − δ˜)[wb + s(ha + hb)] + δ˜(wb + shb) = F + f +
wb + s(ha + hb + e)/2
yielding δ˜ = [(ha + hb − e)/2ha](F + f)/sha.
Therefore the two period result is confirmed.
4.2 Firms with a vertical hierarchical structure
Remuneration schemes in firms with hierarchical structure also depend on
the job levels and changes in employees compensation may be obtained
through a promotion. As pointed out by Baker, Jansen and Murphy (1998),
promotions have two different purposes: i) they are a way to match individ-
uals to the job for which they are best suited and ii) they provide incentives
17
for lower level employees that evaluate the opportunity to increase their
wage and job position obtaining a better one24.
We consider here a tournament promotion system, in which the best per-
former is promoted to the next higher career level. We assume that, if the
(s,na) equilibrium applies, the winner is randomly selected and each of the
two players has a 50 percent chance of getting the promotion. The introduc-
tion of this reward system in our corporate trust game leads us to formulate
the following proposition.
Proposition 7. With an individual winner tournament structure the no
abuse condition never applies.
Assume that player A and player B both work at the same hierarchy
level at the beginning of the game. If the trustor (player A) decides not
to share his information, the payoff set is: {wa + PR | ha > hb, 0 | ha <
hb), wb+PR | ha < hb, 0 | ha > hb,Max(ha, hb)−wa+wb+PR} where PR
is the promotion wage premium. If the trustor decides to share, we have to
consider the (s,a)and (s,na) pairs of strategies. In the first case, the payoff
set is: {wa, wb+PR, ha+hb−wa+wb+PR} while, in the second case, the
payoff set is {wa + PR/2, wb + PR/2, ha + hb + e−wa +wb + PR}. Hence,
the no-abuse condition is wb + PR/2 > wb + PR and can never hold.
The consequence of this result is that the trustor will never share his infor-
mation when ha > hb, while he will be indifferent between doing it or not
when ha < hb. We can therefore conclude that, with a promotion based in-
centive system and an uniperiodal game, the cooperative solution will never
be reached when ha > hb. What happens if we allow for the existence of
relational goods? In this case the trustor’s taste for relational goods creates
some room for the cooperative solution and may offset his propensity to
abuse. If the trustor decides not to share the payoff set will be (respectively
24As in the case of pay-for-performance remuneration systems, disadvantages and ad-
vantages of promotion based incentive schemes are widely debated. Baker, Jansen and
Murphy (1998) underline how incentives generated by promotion opportunities depend on
the probability of promotions and, in turn, on the identity and expected horizon of the
incumbent superior. Moreover, promotion incentives: i) do not work after promotion of a
young employee with a long expected horizon in the job since such promotion decreases
the probability of promotion and the incentive to work hard for co-workers; ii) are reduced
for employees that already obtained it; iii) are absent for employees that fall short of the
promotion standard; iv) generate problems in slowly growing or shrinking firms.
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for the trustor, the trustee and for the firm): {F + wa + PR | ha > hb, 0 |
hb > ha, F +wb + PR | hb > ha, 0 | ha > hb,Max(ha, hb)−wa +wb + PR}.
If the trustor decides to share the idea, the payoff set is
{wa, wb + PR, ha + hb − wa + wb + PR} or
{wa + PR/2 + F + f, wb + PR/2 + F + f, ha + hb + e− wa + wb + PR}
under the (s, a) and (s, na) pairs of strategies respectively. Hence, the no-
abuse condition is F +f > PR/2 . The no abuse condition may therefore be
met in presence of players taste for relational goods. This is because, even
if an employee will not receive with certainty a promotion when he chooses
to cooperate (the probability is 0.5), he may prefer to behave cooperatively
if his taste for relational goods is strong enough.
5 Optimal personnel policies in the trust game
corporation
In the light of the results presented above we may wonder what is the optimal
policy for a trust game corporation which aims at maximising its output.
Under the scenario in which players do not own the firm, by considering the
alternatives of i) a pay for performance scheme, ii) a single winner tourna-
ment system and iii) the investment in relational goods, the third option
is definitely preferred by the firm under reasonable parametric conditions.
Consider the scenario of the single period full information game and assume
to be in those parametric conditions ha > hb, f = F = 0 and e < ha + hb
under which the SPNE of the game is the (ns, .) equilibrium and the firm out-
put loss is, with respect to its maximum potential, ha+hb+e−Max(ha, hb).
In such framework the firm will find it optimal to invest in relational goods
if a production technology of relational goods exists yielding the following
cost function C(f*) = c* such that c*< ha + hb + e −Max(ha, hb) (with
f*= (ha + hb− e)/2−F being the threshold which triggers the switch from
the non cooperative to the cooperative (s, na) equilibrium in the game il-
lustrated in section 2.1). In this perspective the trust game corporation
is a productive environment in which a specific form of corporate socially
responsible behaviour (the creation of a favorable environment for workers)
has a positive effect on productive activity.
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6 Conclusions
By modelling firm activity as a sequence of complex tasks having the basic
features of trust games and requiring the contributions of different work-
ers with nonoverlapping competencies we introduce a crucial feature of the
corporate reality of our times. With this approach we explain some of the
puzzles that standard firm theories cannot account for such as the lower
than expected use of individual pay for performance schemes and single
winner tournament schemes and the existence of corporate expenditures
aimed at increasing relational goods among workers. The corporate trust
game model provides several interesting insights. First, it identifies a mi-
croeconomic nexus between social capital (intended as trust) and creation of
economic value at the firm level. Second, it explains why individual pay for
performance schemes may, under reasonable parametric assumptions, crowd
out social capital and cooperation justifying their lower than expected appli-
cation in the reality. Third, it provides an explanation on why single winner
tournament schemes are seldom implemented by corporations by showing
how they crowd out information sharing and lead to suboptimal output,
even without taking into account their potential effect on workers’ intrinsic
motivations. Fourth, it shows how the taste for relational goods significantly
affects workers cooperation which, in turn, positively affects firm productiv-
ity. As expected, our results are much stronger in single period than in
repeated games but also in the latter our conclusions hold for relevant para-
metric spaces and, in those cases in which cooperative equilibria may be
attained on the basis of the Folk Theorem, we show that such equilibria are
not renegotiation proof.
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Appendix 1
The relevance of relational goods in the workplace
We extract a sample of 82 countries from the World Value Survey and es-
timate the following ordered logit model to evaluate the impact of different
determinants of self declared happiness 25.
Happyi = α0+α1Eqincome+α2[Eqincome]2+α3Male+α4Mideduc+
α5Upeduc+α6Age+α7[Age]2+α8Unempl+α9Selfempl+Σk=1ϑkTimeforrelk+
Σj=1βjDrelincomej +Σi=1γiMarstatusi +Σl=1δlDcountryl
The dependent variable (Happyi) is built on the answers to the follow-
ing question - All considered you would say that you are: i) very happy; ii)
pretty happy; iii) not too happy; iv) not at all happy - by giving descend-
ing values (from 3 to zero) to answers i) to iv). Eqincome is a continu-
ous measure of (income class median) equivalised income expressed in year
2000 US dollar purchasing power parities in levels and in squares. Male
is a dummy which takes the value of one for men and zero otherwise. To
measure the impact of education two dummies are included for individuals
with high school diploma (Mideduc) and with university degree (Upeduc).
Age is the respondent age (introduced in levels and in squares) to take
into account nonlinearities in its relationship with happiness (see, among
others, Alesina et al., 2001 and Frey and Stutzer, 2000). The professional
status is measured by two different job condition variables, Unempl and
Selfempl, recording unemployed and selfemployed individuals respectively.
Timeforrel is a vector including a series of variables measuring the time
spent: i) with friends (timefriends); ii) with working colleagues outside the
workplace (timejobfriends); iii) with the family (timefamily) iv) in the
worship place (parish, mosque, synagogue) with friends sharing the same
25Reliability of self-declared happiness data is supported by Alesina et al. (2001) when
they recall that psychologists, whose core professional activity is studying well being,
extensively use these data. Alesina et al. (2001) also observe that there exists a well doc-
umented evidence of a positive correlation between self declared happiness and healthy
physical reactions such as smiling attitudes (Pavot 1991, Ekman et al., 1990), heart rate
and blood pressure responses to stress (Shedler, Mayman and Manis, 1993), electroen-
cephalogram measures of parefrontal brain activity (Sutton and Davidson, 1997) and
of a negative correlation between the same variable and the attitude to commit suicide
(Koivumaa-Honkanen et al., 2001)
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religious confession (timerelig); v) in clubs or volunteering (sport, culture,
etc.) association (timesportfriend). For each of these questions the an-
swers can be: i) every week; ii) once or twice a month; iii) a few times
per year; iv) never. The difference among intensity modes is not contin-
uous and we rank each of the answers on a scale with values which are
increasing in the time spent for relationship (i.e., 3 if the answer is every
week and 0 if it is never). 26The relative income effect is calculated by
introducing nine dummies (Drelincome) measuring individual position in
the relevant domestic income decile. The four marital status (Marstatus)
variables (Single, Married, Divorced and Separed) are all dummies taking
the value of one if the individual has the given status and zero otherwise.
Country dummies are also included. Table A.2 in the Appendix 2) reports
coefficient magnitude and significance of the timeforrel variables in sub-
sample estimates (males, females, high income OECD countries, low income
OECD countries, European Union) showing the significance of relational
time spent with job colleagues on individual happiness in the subsample of
male, European Union and high income OECD countries.
26By looking at the relationship between our indicator and the likely number of times
per month spent in relationship which can be inferred from sample answers we figure out
that our scale risk to flatten the actual frequency of the time spent in relationship. A
robustness check in which we attribute an approximate per month frequency and use the
value of 4, 1.5 and .3 for the “every week”, “once or twice in a month” and “a few times per
year” answers respectively, shows that our findings are substantially unaltered. Results
are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.
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FIGURE 1 THE UNIPERIODAL FULL INFORMATION GAME 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 THE UNIPERIODAL FULL INFORMATION GAME WITH RELATIONAL GOODS 
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FIGURE 3 THE UNIPERIODAL FULL INFORMATION GAME UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION ON TRUSTEE 
RELATIONAL PREFERENCES 
 
FIGURE 4 THE UNIPERIODAL FULL INFORMATION GAME UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION ON PLAYERS STAND 
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FIGURE 5: THE UNIPERIODAL FULL INFORMATION GAME WITH PAY FOR PERFORMANCE SCHEMES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: THE UNIPERIODAL FULL INFORMATION GAME WITH RELATIONAL GOODS AND PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
SCHEMES 
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Table A2. The effect of relational time on happiness 
 
 
 
 
 
Comp. 
Averleisuredue Male Female
Hi- 
oecd 
NoHi- 
oecd 
European 
Union 
      
Timefriends 0.052** 0.053** 0.162** 0.042** 0.056 
 [0.023] [0.021] [0.048] [0.016] [0.113] 
Timejobfriends 0.047** -0.009 0.07** 0.013 0.169** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.032] [0.012] [0.077] 
Timefamily 0.055** 0.055 0.08** 0.051** 0.055 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.039] [0.017] [0.113] 
Timerelig 0.138** 0.113** 0.155** 0.107** 0.135 
 [0.017] [0.016] [0.031] [0.012] [0.078] 
Timesportfriends 0.065** 0.058 0.088** 0.057** 0.14 
 [0.017] [0.019] [0.03] [0.014] [0.078] 
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GRAPHIC 1. A GRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF PLAYERS’ PAYOFFS IN THE UNIPERIODAL FULL INFORMATION GAME 
(FOR  A GIVEN  bh LEVEL) 
 
 
 
 
 
GRAPHIC 2. A GRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF PLAYERS’ PAYOFFS IN THE UNIPERIODAL FULL INFORMATION GAME 
WITH RELATIONAL GOODS (FOR  A GIVEN hb LEVEL)  
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